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ABSTRACT
Ambiguous language haunts countless fields of human inquiry. The solution to its
confounding nature has repeatedly been to reduce language to its face-value, launching
an endless search for the right meaning. This paper aims to examine two thinkers who
reveal language to be a more complicated matter. Paul Ricoeur and Moses Maimonides
demonstrate the importance of language’s complexity through close examinations of
metaphor. While we find different understandings of metaphor, reflecting different
metaphysics within each author’s study, both Ricoeur and Maimonides contribute to the
notion that language’s complexity is not to be eliminated through literal readings, but
engaged to open up depths of understanding. For the lived religious experience, this
means commitment to scripture as the word of God does not require a fundamentalist
reading of it. Likewise, in the implementation of philosophical principles, the search for
appropriate application need not require a search for and return to original meaning.
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INTRODUCTION
In our quest for knowledge, we grasp at the most ineffable of concepts with the
brittle tools of language. With that has come confusion, miscommunication, and an
endless search for the right meaning. Ambiguous language haunts countless fields of
human inquiry. The solution to its confounding nature has repeatedly been to reduce
language to its face-value. But what if the right understanding is not so simple? The issue
of linguistic uncertainty is particularly consequential within the realms of religion and
philosophy, in which the interpretation of scripture and theoretical work has tidal waves
of repercussions as any conclusion derived can be implemented into daily lives, political
ideologies, and societal institutions. How many declarations of war have been justified by
the words of a text?
This paper aims to examine two thinkers who in distinct ways reveal language to
be a complicated matter. Paul Ricoeur’s The Rule of Metaphor and Moses Maimonides’
The Guide of the Perplexed demonstrate language’s complexity through close
examinations of metaphor. While we find different understandings of metaphor,
reflecting different metaphysics within each author’s study, both Ricoeur and
Maimonides contribute to the notion that language’s complexity is not to be eliminated
through literal readings, but engaged to open up depths of understanding. For the lived
religious experience, this means commitment to scripture as the word of God does not
require a fundamentalist reading of it. Likewise, in the implementation of philosophical
1

principles, the search for appropriate application need not require a search for and return
to original meaning. We are able to take seriously the lessons found in scripture and
philosophical treatises without fear of questioning oversimplified interpretations and
engaging them beyond their surface level.
Chapter One will identify some preliminary definitions of concepts that are
prevalent throughout the study, as well as provide background on the theoretical contexts
of Ricoeur and Maimonides. This requires a brief overview of Aristotle’s categories of
being and foundational search for the space between univocity and equivocity. These
Aristotelian concepts frame both thinkers’ works. The chapter will then move into the
introduction of Ricoeur’s and Maimonides’ contributions to the conversations of their
respective eras as well as their works on which we will primarily focus. Chapter Two
focuses on Ricoeur’s theory of metaphor, its accounting for the creation of meaning, and
the relationship he sees between language and reality. Chapter Three examines
Maimonides’ exegesis of metaphors used in the Bible, and their providing access to the
secret workings of the Law, that is God’s actions, and implications for our being in the
world. The last chapter includes concluding thoughts and potential questions for future
research.

2

CHAPTER ONE
THEORETICAL FRAMING

We are entering a conversation on metaphor that transcends centuries and fields
of study. With such a broad scope, some framing of Ricoeur’s and Maimonides’s points
of entry will be helpful. We start with Aristotle, the man with whom it always seems to
begin. Though we are unable to dive into all the ways the Greek philosopher underlies
each’s study, we do need to acknowledge his determination to expand the notion of
homonymy beyond a random association of disjointed meanings and this effort’s effects
on the relationship between language and reality, as seen in his applying it to the
categories of being. While he may not be the first and only thinker to approach such
topics, both the works of Ricoeur and Maimonides respond to Aristotle’s theories.

ARISTOTLE
Aristotle interwove his thoughts on metaphysics with those of language,
particularly through the notions of synonyms and homonyms. The former, also known as
univocal terms, are those that are always used with the same meaning. The latter, also
called equivocal, multivocal or plurivocal, are the terms that maintain many different

3

meanings that are not interchangeable.1 Aristotle challenges Plato’s metaphysics of
participation through the contrast of these two terms.2 Where participation holds a
univocity across all things deemed, say “good,” Aristotle denies this by showing that
“good” in one context (cake is good, i.e. delicious) does not mean the same thing as
“good” in another (Socrates is good, i.e. virtuous).3
However, Aristotle still refuted an absolute scattering within plurivocity,
especially when it concerned the relationship between his “categories of being.” To find
the space between these two extremes, Aristotle offered a third type of term, a “coredependent homonym.”4 Ambiguous, amphibolous, and analogous have also been used to
signify the dynamic relationships of meaning.5 “Core-dependent homonyms exhibit a
kind of order in multiplicity: although shy of univocity, because homonymous, such
concepts do not devolve into patchwork family resemblances either.”6 Aristotle applied

1

E. Jennifer Ashworth, “Medieval Theories of Analogy,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia
of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta (Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University,
2017), 1, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2017/entries/analogy-medieval/.
2

Christopher Shields, “Aristotle,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed.
Edward N. Zalta (Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, 2016), 31,
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/aristotle/.
3

I am using the same example as Shields. See ibid., 30–31.

4

Ibid., 32.

5

For an extensive look at the different uses of these three terms, see Harry Austryn
Wolfson, “The Amphibolous Terms in Aristotle, Arabic Philosophy and Maimonides,”
The Harvard Theological Review 31, no. 2 (1938): 151–73. For the sake of simplicity, I
use them interchangeably to indicate the purpose behind their creation.
6

Shields, “Aristotle,” 32.
4

this same method to the notion of being being “said in many different ways” (1003a33).7
Aristotle’s Categories offers ten types of being: substance, quantity, quality, relative,
space, time, positioning, having, acting upon, and being affected.8
In Metaphysics, Aristotle also states that “not all knowledge is demonstrative”
(1006a8).9 In isolation, Christopher Shields’ article “Aristotle” explains, the categories
are not “truth-evaluable,” but become so once combined.10 That is, they are not
demonstrable in themselves, but are still knowable through other means – namely,
predication. Shields effectively summarizes the parallel between language and
metaphysics:
the entities categorized by the categories are the sorts of basic beings that
fall below the level of truth-makers, or facts. Such beings evidently
contribute, so to speak, to the facticity of facts, just as, in their linguistic
analogues, nouns and verbs, things said ‘without combination’, contribute
to the truth-evaluability of simple assertions.11
A noun and verb independently say nothing. They simply identify particular forms, that
is, species, of a category, genus, of being. Continuing with Shields’ chosen examples,
“man” indicates a species of the genus substance, and “run” indicates a species of the
genus action. But when combined to form a sentence, they enter a relationship of

7

Ibid., 22. All references to Aristotle’s works are from Aristotle, The Complete Works of
Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation, One-Volume Digital Edition, ed. Jonathan
Barnes, vol. 194, Bollingen Series (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 2014).
8

Shields, “Aristotle,” 35.

9

Quoted in ibid., 22.

10

Ibid., 35–36.

11

Ibid., 36.
5

predication, producing a statement that is then able to be evaluated as either true or false.
Men run. Chairs do not run. Both of these claims are true. “Chairs run” is a false
statement. This is an instance of demonstration.
But notice the first category, substance, is always present. It is an independent
category of being where the rest depend upon it.12 This uniquely required presence of
substance in the predication of being fuels Aristotle’s search for the non-generic unity of
being13 between the categories, specifically between substance and the rest. He resolves
this by defining being as an amphibolous term, indicating a shared dependence on “the
core instance of being, namely substance.”14 Linguistically, the emphasis on substance in
the ambiguous relation of being has been used to give the noun, and therefore naming and
denomination, an elevated place in communication. However, this is not the only notion
of ambiguity. Aristotle lays out a variety of forms of core-dependent homonymy in
Topics 1.15.
The notion of metaphor is intimately tied to the categories of being. Aristotle
defines metaphor as “consist[ing] in giving a name that belongs to something else…”
(Poetics 1475b6) but nevertheless based on some sort of likeness (Topics 140a7-13).15 It

12

S. Marc Cohen, “Aristotle’s Metaphysics,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta (Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, 2016),
5, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/aristotle-metaphysics/.
13

Paul Ricoeur, The Rule of Metaphor: The Creation of Meaning in Language,
Routledge Classics (London: Routledge, 2006), 313–14.
14

Shields, “Aristotle,” 34.

Quoted in S. Theodorou, “Metaphor and Phenomenology,” in Internet Encyclopedia of
Philosophy, accessed October 24, 2019, https://www.iep.utm.edu/met-phen/#H3.
15
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is in the likeness, the resemblance, that we see the notion of ambiguity come through.
This renaming entails a word’s meaning being swapped out for another, preexistent
meaning that may or may not have a lexicalized form.16 This movement, called epiphora,
or the transferring or carrying over, has been identified in line with Aristotle’s thought, as
a “category mistake”17 and contributes to metaphor’s being obscure (Topics 139b34).
Aristotle states that a genus is predicated by its species in a literal sense. Therefore, a
predication by a species outside of a genus’s domain represents one of the category
mistakes of metaphor. Aristotle demonstrates this by giving the example of harmony
being predicated of temperance. Harmony becomes metaphorical because its ordinary
operation within the categories only deals with musical notes (Topics 123a33-36).
In the temperance-harmony example, we are able to see Aristotle’s claim that
ambiguity does not enable something to both be and not be in fact, but only in name
(Metaphysics 1006b19-22). This plays an important role in knowledge acquisition and the
ways we are able to communicate truth claims. When it comes to evaluating a statement’s
truth-value, arguments are judged by their first principles, which are rooted in definitions.
The most challenging definitions to assess, according to Aristotle, are the equivocal (not
core-dependent homonyms) with the metaphorical impossible (Topics 158b10-15). In
fact, nothing can be defined through metaphor (Posterior Analytics 97b37). This roots
reference to reality firmly in the proper predication of being based on his ten categories.

16

Ibid., sec. 1.

17

Ibid.
7

PAUL RICOEUR
Ricoeur’s work is saturated with dialectics, something he shares with Aristotle.18
He dedicated his mind to knowledge gained by holding seemingly conflicting poles in
conversation with one another. We can already see the dynamism of his attempt to define
the ambiguous relationship– a balance found in tension.19 His theory of metaphor is a
focused application of this dialectic approach to account for meaning production and the
experiential ways we understand reality. The Rule of Metaphor is the result of this work.
Aristotle’s definition of metaphor forms the conventional,20 and what Ricoeur
referred to as substitution or denotative, theory.21 He claims it underlies structuralist
linguistics and its related notions of truth:
the denotative theory has served in support of the referential function of
language, one which assumes a system of methodological connections
between language, sense perceptions, mental states, and the external world.
The referential relation between language and its objects serves the
correspondence theory of truth, in that the truth-bearing capacity of
language corresponds to valid perception and cognition of the external
world.22
Ricoeur challenges this definition of metaphor as it denies the part of Aristotelian theory
he seeks to uphold. Namely, not all knowledge is demonstratable, and dialectical methods

18

Shields, “Aristotle,” 24–25.

19

Arguably, this also mirrors the balancing act of Aristotle’s mean of virtuosity in the
Nicomachean Ethics. However, such a parallel requires an examination beyond the scope
of this paper.
20

Theodorou, “Metaphor and Phenomenology,” sec. 1.

21

Ibid., sec. 1a.

22

Ibid. My emphasis.
8

enable apprehension of these non-demonstrable notions through the experience of
predication. In overview, his critique of substitution theory, whose methods nonetheless
serve an important, but not exclusive, role in interpreting metaphor, aims to shift from a
sole focus on the word, the location of denotation, to include the frame of the sentence,
the location of predication. “The metaphor is the tension between two terms in a
metaphorical utterance.”23
Ricoeur proposes instead a tension theory. He predominantly deals with an
interaction theory found in the work of I.A. Richards,24 but teases through this and many
other thinkers’ works to reveal the ways substitution theory continues to permeate
different examinations of metaphor. Ricoeur’s tension theory extends the work of
metaphor not only from the level of the word to the sentence, but also to text and
ultimately to language as discourse. With all these layers involved, Ricoeur outlines four
applications of tension theory analysis: the tension within the statement, that is, a word
that does not fit in its predicative context; the tension between a literal interpretation and
a metaphorical interpretation of the statement; the referential function of “to be,” holding
together both identity and difference as related to resemblance; and the existential
function of “to be,” in which what is said metaphorically both is and is not.25 This latter
application is a direct rejection of Aristotle’s declaration that something cannot

23

Paul Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory: Discourse and the Surplus of Meaning (Fort
Worth: Texas Christian University Press, 1976), 50. My emphasis.
24

Ricoeur, The Rule of Metaphor, 222.

25

Ibid., 292–96.
9

simultaneously be and not be. Through this tension theory, Ricoeur explores the ways
language and reality reflect and express one another.
The tensional approach to metaphor relocates the movement of meaning from
denomination to predication. The problem in the former for Ricoeur is that it denies the
creation of new meaning.26 Challenging the substitution theory is pressing for Ricoeur, as
he finds its implications to transcend the confines of language. His work on metaphor
specifically, and interpretation generally, contributes to his larger development of a
phenomenological hermeneutics, “a battle field traversed by two opposing trends, the
first tending toward a reductive explanation, the second tending toward a recollection or a
retrieval of the original meaning.”27 For him, language does not exist for its own sake, but
as a result of our need to communicate about the world.28 While he is not necessarily
concerned with putting forth a static metaphysics defining reality, his appeal to a
tensional notion of metaphor nonetheless reveals a relationship between language and
reality that is accessed beyond literal meanings.

MOSES MAIMONIDES
Maimonides’ medieval context was likewise drenched in sorting out the
ambiguous middle ground, as it had implications for the theological discourses put forth

26

Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory, 46.

27

Ricoeur, The Rule of Metaphor, 376.

28

Ibid., 257.
10

at the time.29 The discussion involved extensive debate over how we can and should talk
about God. In his article “The Amphibolous Terms in Aristotle, Arabic Philosophy and
Maimonides,” Harry Wolfson suggests five definitions, all rooted in Aristotle, of
amphibolous predication utilized by Arabic philosophers during this era: things that have
one end or proceed from one source; one term applied to a pair of contraries; terms
conveying a primary and subsequent relationship between accidents of being; analogical
or relative terms; relationships of priority and posteriority.30 He highlights the particular
definition found in Maimonides’ Millot ha-Higgayon, and likewise traces its roots to
Aristotle. The Maimonidean definition of the ambiguous term is one that applies to a
relationship between two or more objects that is not based on their essences but on their
accidents, that is, their predications.31 This particular understanding of amphibolous
language underpins Maimonides’ adherence to a negative theology as we will see later.
Maimonides was keenly aware of the issues ambiguous language could produce,
especially as it related to the interpretation of the Hebrew Bible.32 With this in mind, he
wrote The Guide of the Perplexed.33 The title immediately begs the question: who is “the
perplexed?” He identifies such an individual as already educated in the physical sciences
and thus

29

Ashworth, “Medieval Theories of Analogy,” 2.

30

Wolfson, “Amphibolous Terms,” 172–73.

31

Ibid., 163–64.

32

I will use “Torah,” “Bible,” and “Hebrew Bible” interchangeably – that is, the Old
Testament.
33

From here on will be referred to as the Guide.
11

[t]he human intellect having drawn him on and led him to dwell within its
province, [he] must have felt distressed by the externals of the Law and by
the meaning of the above-mentioned equivocal, derivative, or amphibolous
terms, as he continued to understand them by himself or was made to
understand them by others.34
Leo Strauss’s introduction to the Guide emphasizes the importance to Maimonides of
writing this treatise. He summarizes one of the book’s purposes as explaining biblical
terms and similes that maintain a double layer of meaning, the literal interpretation of
which produce the “gravest errors.”35 With such high stakes, Maimonides embeds in his
tome warnings of an improper study’s consequences and implemented methods to shield
his speculations from the destructive reading of the unprepared.
Unlike Ricoeur, Maimonides’ “theory of metaphor” is not an explicit theory put
forth out of a philosophical investigation into language.36 As Strauss puts it, “[o]ne
begins to understand the Guide once one sees that it is not a philosophic book – a book
written by a philosopher for philosophers – but a Jewish book: a book written by a Jew
for Jews.”37 Maimonides believes in the God of the Torah – the latter, the linguistic
manifestation of His Law. From such a position, we first note that Maimonides’
understanding of metaphor and its connection to reality involves a preestablished

34

Moses Maimonides, The Guide of the Perplexed, trans. Shlomo Pines (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1995), 5–6. My emphasis.
Leo Strauss, “How To Begin To Study The Guide of the Perplexed,” in The Guide of
the Perplexed, trans. Shlomo Pines (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), xiv.
35

36

It is worth noting that any time I make a reference to Maimonides’ “theories,” it is not
to reflect a philosophical impetus behind his writings. I use “theory” to indicate the whole
of his thought and the way I am organizing it.
37

Strauss, “How To Begin To Study The Guide of the Perplexed,” xiv.
12

metaphysics reflective of his theology. Then, we understand that the correct, but
nonetheless beyond the literal, interpretation of the Torah is what teaches us about the
world. We must therefore examine Maimonides’ thinking on the way language works in
scripture alongside the metaphysical and theological foundations found in his
interpretation of the Bible. The second goal of the Guide that Strauss identifies – to
explain the secrets of the Account of the Beginning and the Account of the Chariot – aids
us in this process.
Maimonides’ theology and metaphysics are rooted in a “Neo-Platonized
Aristotelianism” that permeated the Islamic philosophical environment in which he
lived.38 Given this context, many expositions of the rabbi have included examination of
his Greek predecessors – predominantly Aristotle, as Maimonides was a student of the
Peripatetic school – and Islamic influences. The more significant of the Islamic
influences include Abu Nasr al-Farabi, Ibn Sina (Avicenna), al-Ghazali, and Ibn Rushd
(Averroes).39 I will focus on al-Farabi to help explain how Maimonides’ version of
emanation may be reflected in his theory of metaphor.40

38

Kenneth Seeskin, “Maimonides,” in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward
N. Zalta (Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, 2017), 1,
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2017/entries/maimonides/.
39

Sarah Pessin, “The Influence of Islamic Thought on Maimonides,” in The Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta (Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford
University, 2016), 1, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2016/entries/maimonidesislamic/; see also Strauss, “How To Begin To Study The Guide of the Perplexed.”
40

I follow Sarah Pessin’s reasoning for al-Farabi’s stronger influence as his being the
earliest thinker and most often referenced by Maimonides in the Guide. See Pessin, “The
Influence of Islamic Thought on Maimonides,” 7.
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CHAPTER TWO
PAUL RICOEUR

Paul Ricoeur challenges literal interpretation by both redefining the literal and
using it to gain access to the metaphorical. As has been mentioned, he does so by raising
a tension theory of metaphor against the substitutive theory grounded in Aristotle’s
definition of metaphor. His approach requires a challenge to our notions of reality itself,
yet without necessarily denying the existence of any reality. While he does not set out an
explicit metaphysical ordering to the universe, Ricoeur provides yet another tool for
understanding the human experience through the metaphorical utterance.
This chapter begins with a look at Ricoeur’s wider interpretation process to help
understand how language generally, and metaphor specifically, contribute to knowledge
acquisition. It then moves into the details of his tension theory of metaphor and its four
applications. From there we move into the way metaphor engages our imagination to
signal unseen parts of reality that cannot be observed, let alone literally referenced. From
there, we see the implications such an approach to metaphor has for the Aristotelian
ordering of being which the substitutive theory of metaphor supports.

14

LANGUAGE AS DISCOURSE
“[A] metaphor does not exist in itself, but in and through an interpretation.”41 It is
therefore helpful to examine Ricoeur’s wider theory of interpretation and metaphor’s
place within it. His aptly titled work Interpretation Theory: Discourse and the Surplus of
Meaning, a compilation of four essays, proves useful to such a venture. To begin,
“[i]nterpretation is a particular case of understanding… applied to the written expressions
of life.”42 Metaphor serves a unique role in fostering life’s expression, as we will see
throughout this study. Discourse, as well as the semantic aims of various types of
discourses, underpin Ricoeur’s rendering of the interpretation process and how metaphor
fits within it.
Interpretation Theory begins with defining language as discourse. Discourse
involves both the noun and the verb, a matter of predication and not simply
denomination, or naming, and encompasses language in use.43 It is this interaction of
identification and predication that enables the production of meaning.44 David Pellauer
and Bernard Dauenhauer include in Ricoeur’s definition that “discourse always involves

41

Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory, 50.

42

Ibid., 73.

43

Ibid., 1–2.

44

Ibid., 11.
15

a speaker or writer and a hearer or reader as well as something said in some situation
about some reality, ultimately a world that we might inhabit.”45
Ricoeur proposes within discourse the dialectic of “event” and “meaning.” The
event of discourse is twofold: the event that is being discussed as well as the event of its
enunciation.46 Ricoeur further explains that while experience cannot be transferred,
meaning can. He thus proposes his axiom: “If all discourse is actualized as an event, all
discourse is understood as meaning.”47 And while the experiential events come and go,
“the text remains for anyone who knows how to read. Hence it is the meaning of the text
rather than the original author’s intention or the originating situation that becomes the
object of interpretation.”48
Yet we want to know if the meaning we find is true. So Ricoeur gives us yet
another dialectic: that of sense and reference. “Only this dialectic says something about
the relation between language and the ontological condition of being in the world.”49
Only because there is something to be said, an experience that we want to share through
meaning, do we speak.50 Again, we see the dialectic of meaning and event at play in

45

David Pellauer and Bernard Dauenhauer, “Paul Ricoeur,” in Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta (Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, 2016),
11, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/ricoeur/.
46

Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory, 16.

47

Ibid.

48

Pellauer and Dauenhauer, “Paul Ricoeur,” 12.

49

Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory, 20.

50

Ibid., 21.
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sense and reference respectively. “In other words, the sense correlates the identification
function and the predicative function within the sentence, and the reference relates
language to the world. It is another name for discourse’s claim to be true.”51
There are many forms of discourse, including poetic, psychological, and
speculative. Each maintains its own “semantic aim” and a code that ultimately
“regulate[s] the praxis of the text,” that is, the particular works of written language,
within the discourses.52 Each discourse has its meanings to be said and guides for how to
say them. Metaphor proves to be a tool used by many of them. In dealing with reference
to something beyond language, the tension of metaphor is felt. In The Rule of Metaphor,
Ricoeur focuses on the intersection between poetic53 and speculative discourses at the
point of metaphor. What this means is that both discourses utilize metaphor, but in a way
that maintains their own semantic aims.
To begin, the poetic is not to be reduced to a decorative mode of expression
achieved via substituting ornamental language for mundane. Poetic discourse carries its
own purpose. It violates the “ordinary” semantic code, making a clear meaning elusive at
first glance.54 However, it does not simply strive to break the rules of conventional
language. “Rather, it seems the goal of poetry is to establish a new pertinence by means

51

Ibid., 20.

52

Ricoeur, The Rule of Metaphor, 259.

53

Poetic discourse is not limited to poetry, but rather refers to the use of non-descriptive,
fictitious language (i.e. unlike the descriptive language of scientific discourses) more
broadly. See Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory, 36.
54

Ricoeur, The Rule of Metaphor, 178. My emphasis.
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of an alteration in the language.”55 That is, poetry offers a new sense of propriety, a new
way to think about things, the expression of which does not (and in some cases cannot)
fall into the established lexical order.
Poetic discourse uses metaphor to accomplish its semantic aims. “Metaphorical
meaning . . . is not the enigma itself . . . but the solution of the enigma, the inauguration
of the new semantic pertinence.”56 However, deeming something metaphorical is not the
same as explicating its meaning. “Interpretation is then a mode of discourse that functions
at the intersection of two domains, metaphorical and speculative.”57 Where the poetic’s
use of metaphor uncovers potential meaning, the speculative proposes its actuality by
articulating an explicit (but still hypothetical for Ricoeur) understanding of the
metaphorical utterance.58 In this way, interpretation is the process by which we produce
our theoretical claims on truth within speculative discourse. However, these claims are
challengeable. They can be met with yet another metaphorical proposition.
According to Pellauer and Dauenhauer’s reading of Ricoeur, religious discourse
covers a wide array of both written and oral linguistic phenomena and is ultimately a
subset of poetic discourse about “naming” God.59 Stephanie Theodorou adds Ricoeur’s
recognition of “the historical life of humans as apprehended in the study of the text (a

55

Ibid., 182. My emphasis.

56

Ibid., 254.

57

Ibid., 358.

58

Theodorou, “Metaphor and Phenomenology,” sec. 4.
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form of spirit), particularly those containing metaphors and narratives conveying a lived,
concrete experience of religious life.”60 In placing the religious under the poetic, Ricoeur
is not diminishing its importance, but rather indicating that its language involves
metaphor because it allows the communication of non-linguistically bound realities that
are fundamental to the religious experience. We now move to exactly how metaphors
accomplish communication of unseen, divine or otherwise, realities.

THE TENSION OF POLARITY
In the structuralists’ Aristotelian derived linguistics, words are classified
according to categories. The classification consists of the words’ established meanings, or
senses. One of Ricoeur’s adjustments comes in declaring that established meaning does
not mean “proper” meaning, but simply what was understood prior to the metaphorical
event, originally or otherwise.61 “[O]ne must dissociate the notion of literal meaning from
that of proper meaning. Any lexical value whatsoever is a literal meaning.”62 However, it
is the preestablished meanings that determine a “proper” ordering of predication in the
sense that the relationships between words are indicative of and responsive to those
recognized meanings. Therefore, when relationships of predication do not reflect the
known meaning of the words, new meanings must be found to account for the new
relationship. “[T]he metaphorical meaning is non-lexical: it is a value created by the
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context.”63 Metaphors that are actually representing preestablished meanings are what
Ricoeur deems “dead metaphors” and are not the same as those that induce meaning
production.64
The poetic discourse evokes images in the readers mind. Conventionally, images,
as expressed in either a noun or a verb, represent both observable and conceptual
phenomena. They serve as signs for those preestablished meanings. However, poetically
formed images are nonsensical, plunging us into unknown waters. This unfamiliarity
comes from the fact that the meanings attached to the signs individually no longer
provide guidance to the meaning of their combination in the sentence, the predication of
noun-verb. This is the location of tension theory’s first application, the tension within the
statement.
Recall that Ricoeur argues the existence of metaphors within an interpretation
process. He locates the conflict that gives rise to metaphor in the incongruity found in a
literal interpretation of nonsensical words. That is, the literal sense as connected to a
literal reference produces what he calls an “absurdity.”65 This is the second application of
Ricoeur’s theory, the tension between a literal and metaphorical interpretation. The
resolution of the “absurdity” requires the literal to give way to the metaphorical.
Thus a metaphor does not exist in itself, but in and through an interpretation.
The metaphorical interpretation presupposes a literal interpretation which
self-destructs in a significant contradiction. It is this process of selfdestruction or transformation which imposes a sort of twist on the words,
63
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an extension of meaning thanks to which we can make sense where a literal
interpretation would be literally nonsensical.66
By rearranging lexicalized signs into new, nonsensical combinations, the metaphor uses
the common code against itself. But in doing so, we are able to access new referents our
previous ordering of notions had covered up. “To speak by means of metaphor is to say
something different ‘through’ some literal meaning.”67
In doing so, metaphor requires us to find “resemblances the previous
classification kept us from seeing.”68 That is, we must uncover a similarity the literal
images hide. This entails an engagement of the imagination as “[n]othing is displayed in
sensible images, therefore; everything, whether associations in the writer’s mind or in
that of the reader, takes place within language.”69 Resemblance is therefore understood as
a product of construction rather than observation.70 We do not find similarity in
observation. We create it in reimagining. The third application of tension theory is found
in the referential function of the verb to be in which “the conceptual structure of
resemblance opposes and unites identity and difference.”71
The final application of tension theory is of the greatest interest for this study. In
it, Ricoeur declares a split in reference to match that in sense.
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If it is true that literal sense and metaphorical sense are distinguished and
articulated within an interpretation, so too it is within an interpretation that
a second-level reference, which is properly the metaphorical reference, is
set free by means of the suspension of the first-level reference.72
Does that mean language ceases to be related to any sense of reality, inaccessible to the
reader? For Ricoeur, no. Rather, it makes the referential function ambiguous. This is the
tension within the existential copula, between is and is not. We will return to the
implications of such a declaration.

TEXTS AND METAPHORICAL NETWORKS
Ricoeur locates metaphorical meaning not only on the scale of the sentence, but
also on that of the text.
Language is submitted to the rules of a kind of craftsmanship, which allows
us to speak of production and of works of art, and by extension of works of
discourse. Poems, narratives, and essays are such works of discourse. The
generative devices, which we call literary genres, are the technical rules
presiding over their production. And the style of a work is nothing else than
the individual configuration of a singular product or work.73
However, reference becomes more complicated at the level of texts, for the writer and
reader do not share the same physical context. The exchange becomes “nonsituational.”74 Texts project worlds through being non-situational, liberating reference
from the particular reference of the author.75 For forms of written communication outside
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of literature, the author can provide enough descriptive language to project the “world” in
which the text was written so that it becomes somewhat shared by the reader. This is
done through ordinary language, given the writer and reader both adhere to it.76 But
metaphorical language adds another layer of complexity. Texts within the poetic
discourse enable an abandoning of reference to the observable phenomena all together.
However, Ricoeur maintains “discourse cannot fail to be about something.”77
The poetic text functions by “bring[ing] an explicit and implicit meaning into
relation.”78 That is, a double meaning. “Hence the relationship between the literal
meaning and the figurative meaning in a metaphor is like an abridged version within a
single sentence of the complex interplay of significations that characterize the literary
work as a whole.”79 The counterpart to the metaphorical utterance is the metaphorical
network.
Ricoeur developed his notion of metaphorical networks through his work on the
symbolic function. The symbol, while operating similarly, is not the same as metaphor
for Ricoeur. “It is a bound activity, and it is the task of many disciplines to reveal the
lines that attach the symbolic function to this or that non-symbolic or pre-linguistic
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activity.”80 Symbols do not have the inventive freedom that metaphors do.81 We can take
his examination of the symbolic function in Mircea Eliade’s Patterns in Comparative
Religion to help elucidate the notion of metaphorical networks.
The symbol as hierophany, manifestations of the Sacred, is found not only in
language, but anything with form and structure. Furthermore, it roots religious discourse,
including its non-verbal components such as ritual, in the materiality of life itself.82 “It is
in this sense that symbols are bound within the sacred universe: the symbols only come to
language to the extent that the elements of the world themselves become transparent.”83
The symbol, in pointing to something bigger than itself, does so as part of that bigger
reality.84 It is this notion of the singular symbol rooted in a larger network that Ricoeur
carries to his theory of metaphor.
Symbols remain “alive,” – that is, pointing to something bigger – due to their tie
to the stability of life itself, transforming with the movement of time and space but never
dying. Metaphors, to avoid death through lexicalization, similarly operate in a network
that maintains their ambiguous functioning.85 Metaphors work with and through each
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other. Before expanding further on the relationship between metaphor and symbol, we
will review the depths of understanding found beyond the literal interpretation.

ACCESSING THE UNSEEN
Imagination plays a fundamental role in poetic discourse’s projection, its “outline
of a new way of being in the world.”86 Through reimagination, the poetic challenges the
world as understood by the established ordinary language. However, what is discovered
through the metaphor is not only unable to be fully captured by the bounds of ordinary
(that is, the commonly used) language, but also escapes what we are able to observe.
[W]e investigate new referents only by describing them as precisely as
possible. Thus the referential field can extend beyond the things we are able
to show, and even beyond visible, perceptible things. Language lends itself
to this by allowing the construction of complex referential expressions using
abstract terms that are already understood . . . in order to explore a
referential field that is not directly accessible, we use predicative
expressions whose sense has already been mastered.87
Ricoeur looks to art to help explain metaphor’s role in understanding new, unseen
parts of reality. While art, as we saw with poetic discourse, is often relegated to
aesthetics, Ricoeur challenges aesthetics’ singular tie to emotion and the implications of
the latter’s opposition to cognition. Recall the relationship between explicit and implicit
meaning that poetic texts utilize. For this relationship to support Ricoeur’s tension theory,
it must be released from the dichotomy of denotation and connotation that parallel the
disjunction between cognition and emotion – that is, connotation being related to
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emotional experience, but not to knowledge acquisition. In relocating metaphor’s
meaning to predication, Ricoeur places cognition in both denotation and connotation,
with metaphor’s emphasis on the latter. “Metaphor has to do with semantics of the
sentence before it concerns the semantics of a word.”88 Through this adjustment, the
implicit, connotative meaning is found in the rearrangement of images that the poetic
discourse entails.
The imaginative component of metaphor’s workings utilizes, with adjustments, a
notion of iconicity. “Poetic language is that language game . . . in which the aim of words
is to evoke, to arouse images.”89 Ricoeur directly challenges Plato’s eikon as “weaker and
less real than living beings… a mere shadow of reality.”90 He offers instead a theory of
iconicity as a re-writing of reality through aesthetic augmentation. “Constructivism is
only the boundary case of a process of augmentation where the apparent denial of reality
is the condition for the glorification of the non-figurative essence of things. Iconicity,
then, means the revelation of a real more real than ordinary reality.”91 Metaphor creates a
“heuristic fiction” in its redescription, requiring the “eclips[ing] of ordinary language”92
to reveal the “real more real than ordinary reality.” In this way, Ricoeur places
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metaphorical language before the descriptive of speculative discourse.93 It therefore has
the power to overthrow what is epistemologically established and offer new visions of the
world around us. We can recall Aristotle’s claim of the existence of non-demonstrative
knowledge. However, with it now accessed through the abandonment of descriptive
reality, Ricoeur challenges metaphor’s inherent tie to the ten categories of being as fixed
metaphysical realities. We return to this in the next section.
Another dimension to the iconic nature of metaphor is its use of limit to access the
limitless. “This positive value of the material mediation by written signs may be ascribed,
in writing as in painting, to the invention of notational systems presenting analytical
properties: discreteness, finite number, combinatory power.”94 It is finitude that gives rise
to the infinite variability of perspective. More still, it is through the engaging, rather than
denying, and rearranging innumerable singularities that we are able to escape the tyranny
of univocity. Thus goes the balancing act of ambiguity.

REWRITING BEING
Ricoeur developed the tension theory of metaphor to account for the creation of
meaning, the location for different understandings of how the world works, that a
substitution theory denied. “Metaphor, a figure of speech, presents in an open fashion, by
means of conflict between identity and difference, the process that, in a covert manner,
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generates semantic grids by fusion of differences into identity.”95 There is a nonantagonistic relationship between creation and discovery in Ricoeur’s theory. In fact, he
emphasizes the word invent as a union (but not fusion!) of both these actions.96 The
invention of metaphor entails the discovery of a new aspect of reality at the level of
reference through the creation of “new, hitherto unnoticed, relation of meaning”97 at the
level of sense.
While Ricoeur stays somewhat within Aristotle’s metaphysics, he runs with
Kant’s reidentifying the ten categories as structures of reasoning used to make sense of
phenomenal experiences.98 Further still, these “schemata” are objectively real,
meant as a distinctive set of mediating representations, rules, or operators
in the mind which themselves display the universal and necessary
characteristics of sensible objects; these characteristics are in turn
synthesized and unified by the activity of the transcendental imagination.99
For Ricoeur, metaphor related to reality in a similar way. Aristotle never resolved the
aporia of being because he held on to the privileged, metaphysical status of his ten
categories. Ricoeur seems to have overcome the issue of ambiguity not by offering a new
definition of a non-generic unity of being. Rather, he put univocity and equivocity in
conversation, in an act of predication, and accepted the reality of such a dialectic – the
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generation of new representations for understanding the world.100 We can hear an
agreement with Derrida’s White Mythology that accuses Western philosophy of
privileging its own metaphors. However, Ricoeur does not let go of Aristotle so easily.
There are still categories, discourses, schema, and all the other words that have indicated
the frames we used to understand the world we live in. Furthermore, those frameworks
remain distinct. “The borders of meaning are transgressed, but not abolished.”101
Generating new representations of being is not the same as generating reality for
Ricoeur. Rather, it is the proposition of a new way of thinking about how it works. “Our
words and deeds are intended to express the meaning of what exists, if only because they
give meaning to things as they now stand. In this sense, our words and deeds get their
significance from being responses to contexts not wholly of our own making.”102 Our
being in the world involves discovering those contexts by creating new ways of viewing
them. But what are these contexts? Here we return to the relationship between metaphor
and symbol.
The point between metaphor and symbol is the “root metaphor.” The root
metaphor grounds other metaphors in metaphorical networks. They both “assemble and
scatter. They assemble subordinate images together, and they scatter concepts at a higher
level.”103 They reach towards symbols in that they
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are so radical that they seem to haunt all human discourse . . . these
metaphors . . . become indistinguishable from the symbolic paradigms
Eliade studies . . . So it appears as though certain fundamental human
experiences make up an immediate symbolism that presides over the most
primitive metaphorical order.104
Ricoeur in these works never explicitly maps out how the universe operates. Perhaps he
simply was not concerned with such an endeavor. He is, after all, a phenomenologist; he
focuses on the ways we talk about existences and the meanings we create for what we
experience. Nevertheless, he ties metaphorical communication to the expression of
human understanding rooted in experiences larger than the words used to describe them,
reflecting their transcendence across time and space.
Ricoeur proposes a tensional theory of metaphor, in which meaning is not found
in preestablished, literal senses, but created by finding similarity where there was once
difference. This requires us not to eliminate the complexity of equivocity, but to partake
in its infinite expansion. Without proposing a replacement, Ricoeur challenges an
inherent metaphysical structure behind the functioning of metaphor. By releasing
metaphor from the denominational substitutive theory rooted in Aristotle’s categories of
being, he liberates metaphor’s innovative capacity and accounts for the phenomenon of
meaning production. He views metaphor’s play with the complexity of equivocity as
enabling a deepening to our understanding of the human experience, especially those
realities that escape the grasp of language.
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CHAPTER THREE
MOSES MAIMONIDES
Maimonides’s Guide105 proves a fascinating case study on the complex workings
of language because 1) while not the Mishnah Torah, it is nonetheless a work of
exegesis106 as it seeks to explain the meaning of the Bible; 2) in its dealing with the
“secrets of the Torah,” the Guide ties metaphor to unseen realities; 3) in doing so, it
specifically addresses the biblical use of metaphor; 4) and does so by itself using
metaphor. Maimonides sees the metaphors of the Torah as key to understanding the truths
of the world we live in. These truths are not found in the literal reading of scripture.
Rather the reader must engage equivocity in order to find the correct meaning the literal
veils. However, the particular words of the Torah still serve a more practical purpose.

MAIMONIDES’ WARNING
With the revelation at Mount Sinai and the prophet Moses both in the past, what
we have left is the text of the Bible to interpret and transfer the meaning of those
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experiences. However, for Maimonides, the Bible is a dynamic book that addresses
different people in different ways. This is particularly important for the topics on which
the Guide focuses: the words describing God and the divine secrets behind the Account of
the Beginning and the Account of the Chariot.
That which is said about all this is in equivocal107 terms so that the multitude
might comprehend them in accord with the capacity of their understanding
and the weakness of their representation, whereas the perfect man, who is
already informed, will comprehend them otherwise. (Guide 1, p. 9)
We can identify two ideas in this perspective. The first is that there is more than one way
to understand the meanings behind the words of the Torah. The second is that there seems
to be a hierarchy between the layers of meaning, including there being correct opinions
within each layer. Maimonides identifies correct opinions as those that uphold God’s
unity and incorporeality.108 We will expand on this through Maimonides’ metaphor for
the dual layering of the Torah. We must first examine the parameters he places on the
exegesis process as it is reflective of the relationship between language and reality found
in his understanding of metaphor.
With accuracy as the end goal, Maimonides makes clear, if anything, that the
implicit messages of the Torah are not accessed by just anyone, nor without a vigilant
approach (Guide 1.5). He advises that there are particular steps to be taken in one’s
grappling with the true meaning of the text (Guide 1, p. 8). He bases this argument on the
meaning and placement of the Account of the Beginning (i.e. Genesis). Maimonides
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believes this section of the Bible to concern the physical laws of nature on which sciences
such as physics, astronomy, biology, and the like are based (Guide 1, p. 9). Moreover,
given that the Torah opens with this account, he interprets that when one approaches the
path of knowledge, one must start with the physical sciences. Once we have mastered
these, we may move on to the metaphysics – the divine sciences – that are found in the
Account of the Chariot. Only after we have mastered the physical, followed by the divine
sciences, is the path to apprehending God opened (Guide 1, pp. 8-9). However, as we will
see later on, this last apprehension is in reality, impossible. Nevertheless, by neglecting
the appropriate method, the religious individual risks losing his or her faith all together
(Guide 1.33, p. 71).
A second, and inverse, component to Maimonides’ warning is that the explanation
of these mysterious components mirrors the challenge of understanding them. That is, we
are never able to fully articulate the secrets of the Torah. This contributes to the danger
Maimonides sees in teaching these topics to the masses. Due to this view, scholars have
often placed Maimonides within an esoteric tradition, requiring that the secrets of the
Torah be taught only within spoken lessons to one individual (Guide 3, p. 415). Yet, he
wrote the Guide, accessible to all, fearing that without it he would be “robbing one who
deserves the truth of the truth” (Guide 3, p. 416).109
Walking the fine line between aiding the perplexed, but nonetheless learned
individual, and harming the common, unlearned one requires perhaps one of the most
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puzzling characteristics of the Guide: Maimonides’ mimicry of the language he seeks to
clarify. He does this to uphold the very reason behind the ambiguous language of the
Torah.
For my purpose is that the truths be glimpsed and then again be concealed,
so as not to oppose that divine purpose which one cannot possibly oppose
and which has concealed from the vulgar among the people those truths
especially requisite for His apprehension. As He has said: The Secret of the
Lord is with them that fear Him [Psalm 25:14]. (Guide 1, pp. 6-7)
Maimonides thus falls in line with the Sages, or philosophers (Guide 1.53, p. 116),110 that
came before him: they also “spoke of it [the meaning behind the accounts] only in
parables and riddles” (Guide 1, p. 8). The use of such a counterintuitive structure
emphasizes the need to abandon literal interpretation when accessing and communicating
unseen realities, namely, God and the truth of His Law. It is in the depths of metaphor
that our knowledge of reality expands.

DUAL LAYERING OF THE TORAH
Unpacking the secrets of the Torah requires a delicate interpretation and
articulation process, as we have seen in Maimonides’ warnings. The Guide lays out an
exegesis utilizing the same rhetorical methods it explains. We therefore come to one of
his own uses of metaphor to explain the Torah’s secret workings.
The entirety of Maimonides’ thought is elegantly enclosed in his comparison of
the Torah to a golden apple covered in silver filigree. The image is based on Proverbs
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25:11, which states, “A word fitly spoken is like apples of gold in a setting of silver.”111
Maimonides draws particular attention to the Hebrew word “maskiyyoth,” translated
above as “setting,” and instead opts for the word “filigree,” “in which there are apertures
with very small eyelets, like the handiwork of silversmiths. They are so called because a
glance penetrates through them” (Guide 1, p. 11). With this specified translation,
Maimonides asked the reader to “see how marvelously this dictum describes a wellconstructed parable” (Guide 1, pp. 11-12) enabling the reader to grasp two meanings, an
external and an internal. While the external is still valuable, the internal is more beautiful,
mirroring the relationship between silver and gold. This is the idea behind the entirety of
the Hebrew Bible.
The parables of the prophets, peace be upon them, are similar. Their external
meaning contains wisdom that is useful in many respects, among which is
the welfare of human societies, as is shown by the external meaning of
Proverbs and of similar sayings. Their internal meaning, on the other hand,
contains wisdom that is useful for beliefs concerned with the truth as it is.
(Guide 1, p. 12)
The Torah’s stories, poems, wisdoms and otherwise directly deliver guidance to a
religious community while simultaneously serving as the means to an internal depth of
divinely ordained truths, glimpsed through the eyelets of metaphor. We will return to the
practical function of the silver filigree later on.
In the actual exegetical component of the Guide, Maimonides demonstrates how
to access the golden core of the Torah by moving beyond the silver filigree. At times the
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internal meanings are found by viewing the composition of a text112 as a whole, while for
others, we must look at, and through, each word. Therefore, Maimonides begins the
Guide by addressing particular derivative, equivocal, or amphibolous words. In doing so,
he systematically lays out the metaphorical network of the Torah. Further still, his Guide
requires referencing its various chapters on particular words to understand others on more
extensive metaphors, such as the Account of the Chariot. This mirrors what he believes to
be the way to approach the Torah, looking at the various senses in which a word is used
throughout the entirety of the Bible in order to access a deeper understanding.

AMPHIBOLOUS TERMS
Maimonides begins the Guide by elaborating the multiple meanings behind key
terms in the Bible. These include those of an equivocal nature as well as those of a
derivative – that is, words formed through the alteration of another. When a word is used
in relation to God, it becomes an amphibolous term, showing a connection that is not
related to a referent’s essence. In applying this definition of ambiguous language,
Maimonides is able to account for the seemingly corporeal and compositional notions of
God found in the Bible.
Maimonides immediately addresses the words “image” and “likeness,” as their
use in the verse Genesis 1:26 is perhaps the epitome of biblical language that implies a
corporeality to God. The part in question reads, “Then God said, ‘Let us make
humankind in our image, according to our likeness.’” Beginning with “image,”
112
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Maimonides explains that when used in reference to God, it does not pertain to the “shape
and configuration of a thing,” which would imply He has a form, but rather to the
notion in virtue of which a thing is constituted as a substance and becomes
what it is. It is the true reality of a thing in so far as the latter is that particular
being. In man that notion is that from which human apprehension derives.
(Guide 1.1, p. 22)113
In this context, “image” is an amphibolous term to indicate there is a true reality, an
essence, that is God, but “image” says nothing about that essence. Therefore, “let us
make humankind in our image” for Maimonides means that God has an essence that
makes Him utterly unique, and that humans likewise have an essence, that makes us
utterly unique. It is not the literal sense of the word “image,” but a metaphorical one that
conveys the true understanding of this statement that upholds God’s incorporeality.
“Likeness” in relation to God is similarly a matter of notion and not form.
Humans’ likeness to God is in the operation of intellectual apprehension.
In the exercise of this, no sense, no part of the body, none of the extremities
are used; and therefore this apprehension was likened unto the apprehension
of the deity, which does not require an instrument, although in reality it is
not like the latter apprehension, but only appears so to the first stirrings of
opinion. (Guide 1.1, p. 23)
In other words, what is (somewhat) alike between us and God is the act of intellectual
apprehension rather than our quiddities. To be alike in essence is to be of the same
species (Guide 1.56, p. 130). Accordingly, there is a relation between things that are
essentially alike as they share placement under a higher genus. That nothing is higher
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than God, and innumerable existences are higher than us,114 serve as two of the myriad
reasons we in no way share a relation to God.
Know that likeness is a certain relation between two things and that in cases
where no relation can be supposed to exist between two things, no likeness
between them can be represented to oneself. Similarly in all cases in which
there is no likeness between two things, there is no relation between them.
(Guide 1.56, p. 130)
To repeat, the likeness between ourselves and God is not a matter of being alike in our
essence: rather there seems to be a similarity found in our actions, which indicates
nothing of how our quiddities might compare.
We also see a suggestion of the limits amphibolous language places on knowledge
of God at the end of the quotation that reads: “but only appears so to the first stirrings of
opinion.” The first stirrings of opinion – a literal reading – is what implies any similarity
between us and God. But this would also imply an attribute of God, which for
Maimonides is nowhere to be found in the true understanding God. What such phrases in
the Bible actually teach us will be discussed in the section on negative theology. It is
helpful to first detour through the metaphysical notions underlying Maimonides’
exegetical processes.

EMANATION AND PROPHESY
To understand the metaphysics behind Maimonides’ concept of metaphor, we can
look to his predecessor, Abu Nasr al-Farabi, who provides a useful (and decidedly
clearer) outline of the Neoplatonic metaphysics that the Guide more or less reflects. In a
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crude summary, al-Farabi’s On the Perfect State takes us step by step through divinity’s
path from the First Cause (i.e. God) down through the heavenly (supralunar) spheres,
each ruled by an intellect (angel), and eventually into the material (sublunar) world in
which we live, bridged by the Active Intellect (the messenger angel, Gabriel).115
Maimonides identifies the movement from sphere to sphere as “divine overflow.”116
Al-Farabi addresses humanity’s place within emanation and access to its higher
spheres in his discussion of the faculties of the soul. These faculties likewise comprise a
hierarchy, beginning at the bottom with the nutritive faculty (how we acquire
nourishment), followed by the faculty of sense (perception of sensibles), then the
appetitive faculty (the location of desire and from where the will arises) and lastly, the
two of greatest interest, the faculty of representation and the rational faculty.117 The
faculty of representation enables us to recall sensory input once the stimuli are no longer
present.118 In essence, it is our imaginative capacity. With the rational faculty, “[man] is
able to know the intelligibles and by it he distinguishes good and evil and by it he grasps
the arts and sciences. An appetition towards the objects of reasoning is joined with this
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faculty as well.”119 Each faculty provides the material for the one above it, knowledge
being acquired by means of the highest three.120
The role of symbolism comes in when the mind is grasping at concepts beyond
the material world.
It [the mind] thus imitates the intelligibles of utmost perfection, like the
First Cause, the immaterial things and the heavens, with the most excellent
and most perfect sensibles, like things beautiful to look at; and the defective
intelligibles with the most inferior and defective sensibles like things ugly
to look at.121
In other words, the imagination deals with objects that do not have form by using the
forms it knows.
The interplay between the faculty of imagination and reason is particularly
important in what al-Farabi called “true visions” and “divination.” These are instances in
which images arrive in the imagination that were not a result of conscious deliberation
but rather of direct intervention of the Active Intellect:
It is for this reason that such things can also be present in the faculty of
representation without having been discovered by deliberation, and so true
visions will arise from the particulars which the Active Intellect gives to the
faculty of representations in dreams. But divinations concerning things
divine will arise from the intelligibles provided by the Active Intellect,
which it receives by taking their imitations instead.122
This is the meeting of the prophets and Gabriel. The existence of prophesy proves
fundamental to the workings of metaphorical language in the Bible.
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For Maimonides, prophets communicate the intelligibles of visions in the two
kinds of parables mentioned in the previous section on the dual layers of the Torah. The
first is through those that constitute a meaning as a whole and the other through utilizing
particular words that are either derivative or equivocal. “In [the latter] case the action of
the imaginative faculty consists in occasioning the appearance of a thing designated by an
equivocal term, through one of whose meanings another can be indicated” (Guide 2.43, p.
392).123
Visions of prophesy can take on awe-inspiring forms that resemble nothing of the
natural world. This is because they deal with the intelligibles only approximated by
human conceptualization. We can see this in one of the more famous instances of these
visionary experiences, prophet Ezekiel’s Account of the Chariot. It is a parable that
requires each word to be looked at carefully. Maimonides’ explanation of the derivative,
equivocal, and amphibolous words reveal the same theory of emanation found in alFarabi. However, it requires us to recall interpretations learned in previous chapters of the
Guide, as the complete elucidation of the vision is not contained in the seven chapters
that address it directly. The vision’s full description in the Bible extends throughout the
book of Ezekiel, but the verses Maimonides addresses come predominantly from chapters
one and ten.
Maimonides explains in Guide 1.4 the verbs to see, to look at, and to vision, as
relating both to the objective activity of the eyes and the figurative notion of “the grasp of
123

There is another way to indicate alternate meaning to the literal through the
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the intellect” (p. 27). To see God is to intellectually apprehend Him; to look at Him is to
focus one’s attention upon Him; and to vision Him is to apprehend Him with the heart
(Guide 1.4). Heart is equivocal including reference to intellect (Guide 1.39). Thus
prophetic visions are intellectual apprehensions. In the Account of the Chariot, we are
dealing with three visions (Guide 3.5, p. 425).
The first involves living creatures with four faces, including the likeness of a
human, an eagle, a lion, and an ox (Guide 3.1, p. 417; 3.3, p. 422). Later the face of an ox
is replaced by a cherub, another term for angel (Guide 3.3, p. 422). “Likeness” here is in
terms of notion. We can understand from the “likeness of humans” what is meant is
intellect, as we saw in Maimonides’ explanation of the term “likeness” (Guide 1.1, p. 23)
and that which makes humans unique being our intellectual apprehension. These angelic
intellects control wheels below them (Guide 3.2, p. 421), which Maimonides identifies as
equivocal for spheres (Guide 3.3, p. 422) – as in the heavenly spheres (Guide 3.4, p. 423)
– in accordance with divine purpose (Guide 3.2, p. 419).
The wheels are the second vision. Once again, “likeness” appears in describing
the relationship of the living creatures to one another and the same between the wheels
(Guide 3.3, p. 423). However, now it is not in an amphibolous relationship as the
creatures and wheels relate in essence, meaning they are members of one species of
being.
The third vision is of a divided man: “Upward from what appeared like the loins I
saw something like gleaming amber, something that looked like fire enclosed all around;
and downward from what looked like the loins saw something that looked like fire, and
there was splendor all around” (Ezek. 1:27). Maimonides directs our attention to the
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order in which the visions are presented. First the living creatures, followed by the
wheels, and then the divided man. “The reason for this lies in the fact that the first two
apprehensions necessarily precede the third apprehension in the order of knowledge, the
latter being inferred with the help of the other two” (Guide 3.5, p. 426). Recall the path of
study of the secrets of the Torah, beginning with the natural sciences and then moving on
to the divine. The divine sciences are indicated here as the angels and their respective
spheres, as we saw in the supralunar emanations outlined by al-Farabi. After
understanding metaphysics, that is the divine sciences, are we able to glimpse what is
indicated by the divided man. Permission to teach this last apprehension was debated
among the Sages. We can, tentatively, infer that the divided man is some sort of reference
to God. However, Maimonides does not venture to explain what the image in Ezekiel’s
vision implies (at least overtly). Nevertheless, we again run into a boundary between the
knowable and God, only peered across through inference.
The dual layering of the Torah is reflective of Maimonides’ understanding of the
way the universe is ordered. The physical, sublunar realm is what we learn about from the
Account of the Beginning, indicated previously in Maimonides’ instruction to begin with
the physical sciences in one’s study. The metaphysical, supralunar realm, is found in the
Account of the Chariot, reflecting a Neoplatonic theory of emanation. However,
understanding the truths in themselves, held within these accounts, requires one to move
past their literal forms. The next section expands the parallel between material and
immaterial existences and literal and metaphorical meaning.
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ACCESSING THE IMMATERIAL
We can look to an article by Sarah Pessin, “Matter, Metaphor, and Private
Pointing: Maimonides on the Complexity of Human Being,” to help us understand the
way this divine overflow interacts with human (notably, not prophetic) nature. Pessin’s
explication of Maimonides’ metaphorical treatment of matter as both a “married harlot”
and a “woman of valor” (images taken from Proverbs 7:6-27) presents an interplay
between the material and the immaterial that can help us further understand that between
the literal and metaphorical interpretation of the Torah.
The first image, that of the married harlot, speaks to matter as a “corporeal
instability in which one form gives way to the next in an unending series of faithless
rifts.”124 The image of a harlot reflects the changing nature of time and space. If
something is always changing, it cannot be the Divine Law itself, let alone God. For laws
to work, they must be consistent and reliable. The material world then is not to be taken
as the Law, but the perishable fruits of its workings. Focusing on the material, as a harlot
supposedly does on pleasure, therefore, undermines the “marriage” of human
understanding with the “intelligible abstractness of universal truths.”125 But that does not
make the material insignificant. Here enters the woman of valor.
Pessin argues that the pairing of a woman of valor with a married harlot gives
space to the complexity of the human soul – “its simultaneous limited and limitless
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nature, and its dual instantiation as actually fallen and potentially angelic.”126 This is due
to the fact that it is only through the material that the human is able to realize such
angelic potential. She explains, “the soul's interaction with images – and with the
particularities of the material world whence these images arise – is a key stepping-stone
towards the sought-after noetic development that lies at the heart of a perfected human
essence.”127
Pessin further identifies metaphor as the embodiment of using the material world
to access the Divine, “ideas that are themselves too abstract to be grasped directly.”128
“For metaphor-together with poetry, parable, and allegorical construction – is a case in
point of how the concrete images derived from the materially particular sensory world
can be used as effective aids in the journey towards knowledge.”129 While we are not to
stop before the literal interpretation, we must nevertheless go through it. This explanation
is aligned with Maimonides’ path of correct study, beginning with the physical laws of
nature, the material, before moving on to the more refined, divine sciences of
metaphysics found in the heavens. In uncovering the layers of metaphorical language, we
ascend back up the spheres of divine emanation.
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NEGATIVE THEOLOGY
Maimonides provides a specific reason for metaphorical communication in the
Bible. The parables and metaphors are products of the perfected faculties of imagination
and reason found in prophets to teach us indirectly how to live according to the wisdoms
only they were able to receive (somewhat) directly.
[B]ecause of the greatness and importance of the subject and because our
capacity falls short of apprehending the greatest of the subjects as it really
is, we are told about those profound matters – which divine wisdom has
deemed necessary to convey to us – in parables and riddle and in very
obscure words. (Guide 1, p. 9)
However, Maimonides’ reasoning emphasizes human limited capacity as well as the
inaccessible nature of the matter at hand (Guide 1.31). We cannot know everything.
An overview of Maimonides’ perspective on describing God can be seen in Guide
1.60, in which he produces yet another of his own metaphorical explanations. He offers
an analysis of a failed, if not utterly ridiculous, representation of an elephant. In
describing something that both flies and swims, dwells in a transparent body with three
wings, and other absurd physical descriptions, one has not only failed to describe an
elephant, but has failed to describe anything in existence (Guide 1.60, p. 146). Similarly,
“one who affirms an attribute of Him [God] without knowing a thing about it except the
mere term, it may be considered that the object to which he imagines the term applies is a
nonexistent notion – an invention that is false” (Guide 1.60, p. 146). What does this say
about God’s existence? Nothing. Which is the point. However, this does not deny God’s
existence but that “God, as subject, transcends the normal parameters of language and
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conceptualization.”130 Yet we talk about God. Continuously. In the face of such a reality,
Maimonides follows a negative theology, declaring the correct way to talk about God is
in negation (Guide 1.58, p. 134). For example, “the meaning of our saying that He is not
powerless is to exemplify that His existence suffices for the bringing into existence of
things other than He” (Guide 1.58, p. 136). More drastically, in using affirmative
language concerning God, one has not merely failed to understand Him properly, but
“has abolished his belief in the existence of the deity without being aware of it” (Guide
1.60, p. 145). In other words, the religious individual has undermined their own
monotheistic faith. To affirm any attribute of God actually denies His unity.131 By saying
God is anything, we imply a multiplicity within Him. If we call God both just and
merciful, then we imply that there is a point where His mercy ends and justice begins. For
Maimonides, this denies God’s utter unity.
However, negations are still attributes, in that they particularize to a certain extent
what they predicate, although indirectly through the inference of what is not excluded
(Guide 1.58, pp. 134-135). They are nonetheless different than affirmations:
The attributes of affirmation, even if they do not particularize, indicate a
part of the thing the knowledge of which is sought, that part being either a
part of its substance or one of its accidents; whereas the attributes of
negation do not give us knowledge in any respect whatever of the essence
the knowledge of which is sought, unless this happens by accident (Guide
1.58, p. 135)
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Negations are ambiguous. Furthermore, they are necessary to lead us to the correct
opinions, “that which must be believed with regard to Him” (Guide 1.58, p. 135), namely,
His incorporeality and unity. We do so because the more we learn of what He is not, the
closer we come to apprehension, but never actually reach it (Guide 1.60, p. 144).
God does not fit into Aristotle’s categories of being. Here enters a key feature of
Neoplatonic influence. God, unlike Aristotle’s primary substances, most notably being
itself, does not actually enter into relationships of predication according to Maimonides.
This applies to all attributes professed of God. What makes a primary substance unique,
its “oneness,” is not the same notion that applies to God’s unity. When we say God is
something, it is simply to indicate what He is not (Guide 1.58, p. 134). We saw what
seems to be something similar in Ricoeur’s final application of his tension theory, the
existential copula that declares something both is and is not. However, unlike Ricoeur,
we do not create a new understanding of God’s essence: we depart from talking about it
all together.
Yet the Bible uses affirmative language. However, remember the golden apple
covered in silver filigree. The one who believes the Bible to say anything about God,
especially implying a corporeality and multiplicity, “was not led to it by intellectual
speculation; he merely followed the external sense of the texts of the Scriptures” (Guide
1.53, p. 119). Maimonides states that the attributes in the Bible “are mentioned only to
direct the mind toward nothing but His perfection, may He be exalted, or that they are
attributes referring to actions proceeding from Him, as we have made clear” (Guide 1.61,
p. 147).
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But what does it mean to talk about God’s actions? Another article by Pessin, “On
Glimpsing the Face of God in Maimonides: Wonder, ‘Hylomorphic Apophasis’ and the
Divine Shawl,” helps us to understand Maimonides’ explanation of descriptions of God
found in the book that he believes to declare God’s essence inaccessible.
Unlike the “divine powers” of other thinkers, divine attributes, for
Maimonides, are not real; God, for Maimonides, does not actually have any
attributes. Far from “corresponding” in any sense to divine attributes (or
powers, or the like), a claim like “God is merciful” . . . tells us nothing about
God – it tells us, rather, something about the world.132
Statements about God are statements about His actions that we in turn are able to
experience. On our path to learning the Torah’s secrets, we will in fact learn nothing of
God save the implications of His existence.
Ultimately language is insufficient, but this results from our own inability to
apprehend God, for only God apprehends Himself.
all men, those of the past and those of the future, affirm clearly that God,
may He be exalted, cannot be apprehended by the intellects, and that none
but He Himself can apprehend what He is, and that apprehension of Him
consists in the inability to attain the ultimate term in apprehending Him.
(Guide 1.59, p. 139)
What is in our power to apprehend is only done through negation and is ultimately not
reflective of the true reality of the referent – only what that referent’s existence means for
us (Guide 1.59, p. 139). Language is but a means to order our life according to our
experience of the Laws set by the One we cannot understand (Guide 1.54, p. 125).

Sarah Pessin, “On Glimpsing the Face of God in Maimonides: Wonder, ‘Hylomorphic
Apophasis’ and the Divine Prayer Shawl,” Tópicos 42, no. 1 (2013): 80,
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THE ROLE OF RELIGION
When examining Maimonides’s theory, a natural question arises: what can the
“common” individual, the one who will inevitably follow the literal understanding, find
in the Torah? We return to the carefully crafted silver filigree. The words of the Torah are
not solely there to safeguard us from the full beholding of God’s Glory. Ultimately,
The Law as a whole aims at two things: the welfare of the soul and the
welfare of the body. As for the welfare of the soul, it consists in the
multitude’s acquiring correct opinions corresponding to their respective
capacity. Therefore some of them (namely, the opinions) are set forth
explicitly and some of them are set forth in parables. For it is not within the
nature of the common multitude that its capacity should suffice for
apprehending that subject matter as it is. As for the welfare of the body, it
comes about by the improvement of their ways of living one with another.
(Guide 3.27, p. 510)
Human welfare involves the realm of religion as praxis, embodied in the commandments
that direct us on how to live together. God gave Moses the Law so that humans may
acquire both perfections, “the welfare of the states of people in their relations with one
another through the abolition of reciprocal wrongdoing and through the acquisition of a
noble and excellent character” (Guide 3.27, p. 511). Not all the commandments are
communicated through metaphors, but the answer Maimonides gives in his explanation
of accessing the reasoning behind seemingly arbitrary ones will sound familiar.
The perplexed individual must not seek a reason in the minutiae, but the divine
law from which the commandments extend.
Accordingly, in my opinion, all those who occupy themselves with finding
causes for something of these particulars are stricken with a prolonged
madness in the course of which they do not put an end to an incongruity,
but rather increase the number of incongruities. Those who imagine that a
cause may be found for suchlike things are as far from truth as those who
imagine that the generalities of a commandment are not designed with a
view to some real utility. (Guide 3.26, p. 509)
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Take Maimonides’ example of sacrifice: the purposes behind the sacrifice are not to be
found in the type of animal or number to be sacrificed, but in the general notion that
sacrifice is good for the perfection of the body and soul. “The constant statements of [the
Sages] to the effect that there are causes for all the commandments… have in view the
utility of a given commandment in a general way, not an examination of its particulars”
(Guide 3.26, p. 509). The particulars could be any particular as long as they serve the
purpose found at a higher level of apprehension.
This is a similar relationship to the one we saw previously between the seen and
the unseen. The welfare of the soul is achieved through that of the body (Guide 3.27, p.
510). The first meanings any individual will encounter from the Torah are the practical
and physical ways to order one’s life. The religious discourse, unlike Ricoeur’s naming
God, is concerned with prescribing a virtuous life in understandable terms for the
common individual. It moves us to action without assigning reason beyond that God said
so. Further still, the production of virtuous action occurs without any interaction with the
speculative. By acting these out, the individual is able to attain the benefits of living
according to God’s Law without needing to understand the hidden layers of meaning. We
can recall Maimonides’ path of study that started with the physical sciences before
moving on to the divine. Only after the prescribed religious practices have been mastered
will we be able to understand the truth “as it is.” We see more clearly the ways that
Maimonides’ approach to the interpretation of the metaphors that cloak the secrets of the
Torah mirrors the Neoplatonic notion of emanation. The visible realm of the body, while
lower than, is nevertheless an extension of and point of access to the invisible realm of
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the soul. We can hear the echoing metaphor of matter as a married harlot and woman of
valor.
The speculative, in this case, the exegesis of scripture,133 explicates meanings
rooted in the unseen realms. Maimonides places the Guide in the speculative as seen in
his stating “that which has occurred to me with regard to these matters, I followed
conjecture and supposition; no divine revelation has come to me to teach me that the
intention in the matter in question was such… it is possible that they are different and that
something else is intended” (Guide 3, p. 416). While for Maimonides there certainly is a
correct understanding of the internal and external layers of the Torah, he does not claim
to have reached a point of full apprehension of the former. In fact, “[y]ou should not
think that these great secrets are fully and completely known to anyone among us. They
are not” (Guide 1, p. 7). Maimonides nonetheless believes striving for correct
understandings to be an essential component to inquisitive existence. With this
Maimonides draws a connection not only between language and reality generally, but
language and the thriving of human nature specifically.
Moses Maimonides, despite being a deeply religious man, does not find the truth
of his scripture in its literal interpretation. In fact, he argues that the Torah has been
powerfully constructed to both provide access to the truth dwelling on a deeper level and
comprehensible guidance. The key, according to Maimonides, is metaphor – language
that functions with a dual layering to achieve both of those goals. While he holds the
133
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discourses of those who do not believe in God. Therefore, all the critiques he makes of
different theories put forth are also under the presupposition that God exists and that there
is some order to the world. He, like everyone else, aims for the correct understanding.
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interpretation of the Bible’s metaphorical language to be important, Maimonides does not
believe such a process is for just anyone, much less something to be made available to the
masses. With this in mind, he provides extensive warning and guidance for exegesis of
the Torah in his Guide. Both his interpretation and its instruction reflect a structuring of
the Bible’s language that matches the metaphysical chain of emanation Maimonides
believes the universe to hold. However, access to these deeper truths requires us to
abandon our notion that the literal interpretation of scripture reveals the truth “as it is.”
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CONCLUSION

Humans have the unique capacity to organize through our use of language.
Narratives, written or oral, are able to transcend time and space, bringing us into
conversation with one another as we negotiate the meaning and application of our
binding stories. The written word perhaps has added a new dimension as it can be
received by a lone individual who then brings a new understanding to a tradition’s
interpretation and application of its history. Nevertheless, the stories we share contribute
to our cooperation and well-being as humans.
Narratives that bind us together have long come out of what we recognize as
religious traditions. However, philosophical doctrine has likewise taken its hold on public
consciousness. While texts have served to unite peoples, they have simultaneously been a
root cause of our disunity. Not only do narratives compete with one another,
consequently bringing communities into conflict with one another, but they also provoke
disputes within communities. These inevitably come with the search for the true meaning
behind words.
It is possible to believe in the truth of a text without holding to a straightforward
interpretation of it. Language, like the human experience, is dynamic and complex,
requiring an active engagement of the equivocity that often incites anxiety. Paul Ricoeur
and Moses Maimonides demonstrate the longstanding notion that there is more to
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language than meets the eye. In fact, each finds the reduction of language to its simplest
rendering denies fundamental components to the human experience and workings of the
world. Metaphor proves the prefect phenomenon to expose this.
For Ricoeur, language not only holds a multiplicity of meaning in its words, but it
also involved the creation of new meaning. In his reworking of the foundations set by
Aristotle, Ricoeur argues that the metaphorical statement is the location of meaning
production. While it does not hold inherent metaphysical parallels, metaphor provides a
tool for our proposing the workings of the world. This involves making visible what has
not been thought of before through the reimagination of the meanings we have previously
acquired.134 While he does not provide a particular case of interpretation and a
subsequent correct meaning behind a text, Ricoeur nonetheless insists that lexicalized
meanings come after the metaphorical utterance and are thus created as new parts of
reality are discovered and communicated. In such a reversing of the metaphorical and
speculative, we are able to revive the ambiguous nature words hold in their core and give
new life to words we long thought semantically settled.
Maimonides, while adhering to a metaphysical theory of emanation and a set of
correct meanings to be acquired, argues that the truth of scripture, the secret workings of
God’s Law, are not housed in the literal interpretations of the Torah. In fact, believing
those to be the location of truth prevents the religious individual from remaining within
his or her belief. However, the search for the meaning of the Torah is no easy feat. Hence
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why Maimonides has been placed in a line of esoteric traditions, in which an individual
must be deemed ready before they are to be taught the truth.
In looking at these two thinkers, some questions arise for further research on both
Ricoeur and Maimonides. For Maimonides there is a particular way the world operates
and therefore truth revealed in language is reflective of this ordering, including a limit on
human understanding in reference to God: does Ricoeur’s theory of metaphor deny an
absolute truth, even if a single individual never comes to know it? Does he set a limit to
humans’ knowledge capacity, making room for an unknowable God? Additionally,
Maimonides assigned a practical role to the particular metaphors chosen in the Torah:
does Ricoeur discuss the implications of the chosen words in meaning production?
Ricoeur sought to liberate metaphor’s potential in describing the world as we perceive it:
do Maimonides’ metaphysical and theological foundations allow for redescription? Is the
gleaming amber and fiery splendor enfolding the divided man a testament to the
infinitude of our experiencing and describing God’s actions above and below?
It remains to be seen if humans will ever eliminate the challenges that come with
language’s complexity. However, what if they are not meant to be eradicated to begin
with? Ricoeur’s and Maimonides’ studies of metaphor seem to imply another solution.
Perhaps we overcome the challenges of communication by engaging ambiguity rather
than subduing it through literal reading.
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